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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I ,

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to

consider the mitigating circumstances presented by the Appellant
at the sentencing hearing held pursuant to U.C.A, § "'7 6-3-201 (5) (c)?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is i Petition for Rehearing of the decision filed by this
Court on March 29, 1991. On a prior appeal this Coin t affirmed the
Appellant's convictions for Aggravated Sexual Assault and Aggravated Kidnapping, but vacated the Appellantfs original sentences
because they di d not conform !u the .statutory punishments for the
offenses for which he was convicted*
sentenced

;

The Appellant was then

three (3) concurrent minimum-mandatory terms of 10

years to 1.: -

- AppoJIrant 'hen appealed his sentences to this

Court contending that the corrected harsher sentences imposed by
the trial court violated U.C.A. § 76-3-405 and offended the double
jeopardy provision of the IJniind States Constitution.

This Court

rejected those contentions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts si this rase are ,eil known 4~s> this Court.
v. Babbel, 770 P.2d

987

Adv.Rep. 47 (Babbel II)
known Is i. this

I'UIJI

(Utah 1989) (Babbe.

. „ ...

State
^ Utah

However, in addition to the facts already

t , a few additional facts are necessary in order

to review the issue presented herein.
1

On March 24, 1989, the Appellant appeared with counsel before
the trial court for a re-sentencing pursuant to this Court's order
in Babbel I. Appellant's counsel presented the Court with a number
of mitigation reports. These reports included the Appellant's Utah
State Prison records, a report from Southwest Utah Mental Health,
a report from Intermountain Sexual Abuse Treatment (I.S.A.T.), and
a record of volunteer work in the community.
are part of the record.

None of these reports

However, the record of the sentencing

hearing clearly reflects that they were provided to the court and
the prosecution.

(3/24/89 Transcript, pgs. 6-7).

All of the

reports were favorable to the Appellant.
However, when the trial judge imposed sentence, he refused to
consider any of the mitigating circumstances presented by the
Appellant:
Although your record, since the time of conviction, has been exemplary, I am not sure
that's what the statute takes into consideration when it talks about mitigation or aggravation. I'm really talking about the facts of
the crime itself. I find nothing in this case
which would be aggravating and nothing which
would be mitigating in particular; therefore,
on each of those terms I am going to impose
the middle sentence of minimum-mandatory of
ten years and which may be for life. Each of
those three to run concurrently.
(3/24/91 Transcript, pg. 13).

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
how the Appellant had conducted himself during the four (4) years
of incarceration between the time ot his rn IHS! MMI! t he t nut;;* ot lii.-.i
re-sentencing.

The

statute

which

sets

framework for minimum-mandatory offenses,
states quite clearly that

T

forth

the

sentencing

"\ A . § '76-3-201( 5)(c),

J

.:.--»* : -.

:-

1

in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports. . . .
statements in aggravation

i nitigation submitted

tion or the defendan t:
sentencing hearing."

•• - \

^ne prosecu-

. i-i.

: . ed at' the

he n- • =-i court's refusal t

ven consider

the mitigating circumstances presented by the Appellant mandates
remanding t.his mat lei Jul .mother sentent mtj hedi ini| with instiiirtions to the trial court to at least consider the Appellant's
mitigating circumstances•
INTRODUCTION
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Pule *-•• ii+ab
Rules of Appellate
rehearmu,

Procedure.

in Brown v.

Pickard,

denying

II !J , "ml " i lit dti IMHh), 1 IH* Ht-ah Supreme Court estab-

lished the standard for granting a Petition for Rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made.
We must be convinced that the Court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions.... .
11 P. at 512

3

Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913), this
Court added:
To make an application for rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to discourage the practice of filing Petitions for
Rehearings in proper cases. When this Court,
however, has considered and decided all of
the material questions involved in a case, a
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued, or overlooked some statute
or decision which may affect the result, or
that we have based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, or have either misapplied or
overlooked something which materially effects
the result . . . . If there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a Petition for a Rehearing
should be properly filed, and if it is meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized
by this Court.
Id at 624.
The argument advanced in this Petition has not been previously
presented. However, this argument is in support of the Appellant's
attack on the lawfulness of his sentences.
an unusual procedural course.
was filed pro se.

This case has charted

The Appellant's brief in Babbel II

This Court appointed Joan Watt with the Salt

Lake Legal Defender Association to present oral arguments on behalf
of the Appellant.

The undersigned counsel was subsequently ap-

pointed to review the merits of filing a Petition for Rehearing.
Significantly, the Appellant did not have the benefit of counsel
when he filed his brief in support of the Babbel II appeal.
Because of the complexity of the issues, the Court of Appeals
recently granted the State's Petition for Rehearing in State v.

4

Sampson, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. 4 (1991), notwithstanding that the State
had failed to raise certain arguments in its initial appeal.

The

Appellant submits that the unique procedural posture of this case
justifies visiting the issue presented herein.

A review of the

record from the sentencing hearing discloses that an error has been
overlooked "which materially affects the result."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO
CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED BY
THE APPELLANT AND AUTHORIZED BY U.C.A. § 76-3-201(5)(c).
In Babbel I, this Court vacated the Appellant's original
sentences because they did not conform to the statutory punishments
for the offenses for which he was convicted.

The sentences first

imposed were illegal because the trial court treated the convictions as if they were ordinary first degree felonies, rather than
first

degree

felonies

subject

to minimum-mandatory

sentences.

Based upon the mandate of U.C.A. § 77-35-22(e) (supp. 1981), this
Court directed that the Appellant be re-sentenced in Babbel II.
At the time of the re-sentencing on March 24, 1989, the
Appellant had been incarcerated for nearly four (4) years.

During

the period of his incarceration at the Utah State Prison, the
Appellant availed himself of many treatment and rehabilitation
programs offered by the Department of Corrections.

5

These counsel-

ing programs included the Intermountain Sexual Abuse Treatment
(I.S.A.T. ) and a Southwest Utah Mental Health program. Additionally, the Appellant received no disciplinary write-ups while housed
at the Utah State Prison.
In eschewing this mitigation evidence, the trial judge did not
rule that the evidence failed to justify imposing the lowest term
of severity.

Instead, the trial court made the threshold decisijpn

to not even consider the proffered evidence. The judge erroneously
believed that he was constrained to consider aggravation and
mitigation in the context of only the crime.

The trial court

elaborated on this reasoning by stating, "I'm really talking about
the facts of the crime itself." (3/24/89 Transcript, pg. 13).
Yet nothing in the governing statute requires such a limitation on the evidence. U.C.A. § 76-3-201(5)(c) provides:
In determining whether there are circumstances
that justify imposition of the highest or
lowest term, the court may consider the record
in the case, the probation officer's report,
other reports, including reports received
under section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
American jurisprudence has long endeavored to individualize
punishment to fit the particular defendant and his circumstances.
In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), it was reversible
error to exclude evidence of the defendant's good conduct in prison
6

at his sentencing hearing.

The Court noted, "A defendant's

disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life
in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its
nature relevant to the sentencing determination."

The relevance

of a defendant's good or bad behavior while incarcerated pending
a successful appeal was considered in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 (1969).

In Pearce, the United States Supreme Court ruled

that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully
attacked a conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives
after the granting of a new trial.

In reaching this result, the

Court noted that:
A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing a new
sentence, whether greater or less than the
original sentence, in the light of events
subsequent to the first trial that may have
thrown new light upon the defendant's "life,
health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral
propensities." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1948). (Emphasis supplied).
Because this Court vacated the Appellant's original unlawful
sentence, he should have been entitled to reap the benefits of his
excellent prison record when he appeared before the trial court for
the imposition of sentence. When re-sentencing a criminal defendant under these circumstances, there is no constitutional or
statutory limitation on the evidence which the judge may consider:
Such information may come to the judge's
attention from evidence adduced at the second
7

trial itself, from a new presentence investigation, from the defendant's prison record, or
possibly from other sources. The freedom of
a sentencing judge to consider the defendant's
conduct subsequent to the first conviction in
imposing a new sentence is no more than consonant with the principle, fully approved in
Williams v. New York, supra, that a state may
adopt the "prevalent modern philosophy of
penology that the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime."
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723.
CONCLUSION
The proffered mitigation evidence was relevant and should have
been considered by the trial judge.

The trial court's failure to

consider this evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion and mandates that this matter be remanded to the trial court with an
instruction that the proffered mitigation evidence be considered
and weighed under the framework set forth in U.C.A. § 76-3-201(5)(c)
DATED this

day of

>N

*°^-

, 1991.

/ALTER F. BUGDEN,/JR<
WALTER
Attorney for Petition*
CERTIFICATION

I, WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., do hereby certify that I am the
attorney appointed to represent the Appellant, William H. Babbel,
in this case; and that this Petition for Rehearing is presented to
this Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
DATED this

| (rfrday of / \SH^—

, 1991.

WALTER F. BUG&ZN/vJRy
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I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, by first class postage
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Sandra L.
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236 State
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